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This study provides a new empirical approach about the money multiplier process, using monthly 
monetary data from Angola since January 2012 until June 2018. The use of an ARDL model 
allows to test the long run relationship of both the money multiplier and the reserve to deposit 
ratio and consider the short-term adjustments from monetary shocks. The analysis focuses mainly 
on the level of concentration of the banking system, the degree of liquidity of banks’ liabilities 
and the interest rate as determinants of the long-term ratios. Other country specific factors such 
as the foreign exchange rate spread and the non-performing loans ratio have been included to the 
analysis, to consider Angola’s macroeconomic challenges. It was concluded that according to 
monetary theory, both the interest rate and the level of concentration of the banking system affect 
the long-term ratios. However, the non-statistical significance of banks’ liabilities liquidity opens 
a policy recommendation for Angola’s monetary policy. 
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The money multiplier was and still is a central parameter of the money creation process. Its 
description, stability and even its existence sit at the core of monetary theory from its beginnings. 
Mathematically, it is just a ratio between a broad monetary aggregate and a narrow one, 
specifically the monetary base, the one that is controlled by the central bank. However, it is not 
the existence of a ratio that we will enquire about. We will search for the possibility of existence 
of a disequilibrium process that creates a multiple expansion of the money supply through the 
actions of a central bank. 
Recently, the large injections of monetary base by the world leading central banks that caused 
money multiplier ratios to collapse, led to a debate concerning the role of the money multiplier in 
monetary theory. That discussion has origins on different debates that developed in monetary 
theory along the centuries, such as the Metallist vs Chartallist debate (about the origin of money), 
the Currency vs Banking School (about the convertibility of money), the Keynesian vs 
Monetarists (about the effects of monetary policy) evolving in recent years to the discussion about 
the endogeneity of the money supply (versus the exogenous – controlled by the Central Bank 
version). 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature because it tries to regain some space for the money 
multiplier back in monetary theory by approaching it in a fixed exchange rate environment with 
a developing financial system that is constantly hit by shocks in its monetary base through foreign 
exchange flows which have short-run impacts on the multiplier. The stability of the reserves to 
deposits ratio will also be tested as a proxy to the multiplier process.  
Our goal is to test with an Autoregressive Distributive Lags (ARDL) model if the increase in 
banking competition, the composition of the deposit aggregates and the interbank interest rate has 
any impact on the process of adjustment to monetary shocks that may be observed by the volatility 
of the reserves to deposits ratio and the money multiplier ratio. 




The dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a review of the relevant literature on the 
money multiplier and Section 3 describes the theoretical approach concerning the process of 
money creation. In Section 4 we analyse Angola as the case study, and in Section 5 we present 
the data and the methodology. Section 6 enunciates the empirical results. In Section 7 we give 
some recommendations based on our results, and section 8 concludes. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Arthur Phillips, in 1921’s Bank Credit, formulated the money multiplier process in a 
comprehensive way through a bank accounting registration of operations, as it was described only 
vaguely by previous Cambridge economists, as Alfred Marshall. After the exposition of the theory 
by Philips (1921), the money multiplier became a well-known device among monetarist 
economists, like Brunner and Meltzer (1964) that built a general model around the concept of the 
multiplier.  
Friedman and Schwartz (1964), in their Monetary History extensively analysed the behaviour of 
monetary aggregates throughout US history with special emphasis to the monetary contraction 
that occurred during the Great Depression. They explained the Great Depression through a money 
multiplier framework, pointing to an increase in the currency ratio and afterwards of the reserve 
ratio as causes for the contraction in the broad monetary aggregates and therefore to nominal 
spending collapse and deflation. 
The money multiplier gained special relevance in the nineteen eighties, with the rise of monetary 
targeting and forecasting.  Johannes and Rasche (1979) built parametrical component estimation 
procedures to try to gain some predictability in the usage of the money multiplier for monetary 
control. Hafer (1984) stated that an aggregate projection of the multiplier was as good as a 
decomposition of the components. Hetzel (1986) questioned the direction of causality implied in 
the money multiplier, in a regime of interest rate targeting, focusing also on the non-orthogonality 
of monetary base with the multiplier, as some components of the multiplier are interest rate 
sensitive. 




Nowadays, the division of opinions about the money multiplier occurs mainly in a difference of 
importance attached to the reserve position of commercial banks in the process of credit creation. 
Most new keynesian economists, monetarists and free banking theorists state that the money 
multiplier model would break whenever the policy interest rate reaches the zero-lower bound, 
because Treasury bills and money would become perfect substitutes, a liquidity trap (Krugman, 
1998), or if the payment of interest on reserves shifts up that floor above zero, (Selgin, 2018). 
Another argument used is concerned about the permanency of the injection of monetary base 
(Beckworth, 2017). If the injection of monetary base is not supposed to be permanent, it should 
not have a great impact on the money creation process and therefore the money multiplier would 
be negatively affected by the injection. 
The main criticism of the money multiplier model comes from the endogeneity side of the 
monetary debates. Lebourva (1962) explained that the causality of monetary creation was 
reversed, and instead of a money multiplier, the process of money creation was better described 
with a money divisor. That criticism was further developed by Lavoie (1984), Mosler (1995) and 
Fullwiler (2006) that stated that central bank operations passively create monetary base whenever 
there is a need to maintain an interest rate target. Godley and Lavoie (2006) further developed a 
broad monetary system that describes the money creation process endogenously, rendering 
irrelevance to the money multiplier. 
This heterodox criticism has also been adopted by central bankers at least since Holmes (1969) 
discussed monetary control, stating that it is the Federal Reserve purpose to supply reserves to 
fulfil its interest rate target, but allowing commercial banks to make the first move, as bank credit 
creators, a position also taken by Bindseil (2004) when investigating the conduct of monetary 
policy, advocating therefore the reverse causality between bank reserves and loan creation. The 
Bank of England (McLeay et al; 2014) has comprehensively explained the reverse causality of 
the money multiplier in an interest rate targeting regime. Carpenter (2012) studied in a VAR 
analysis the relevance of money multiplier in the United States, only to conclude that it is 
unimportant in current day’s monetary procedures. 




In a fixed exchange regime, the money multiplier process is left untouched by theorists (except 
Lavoie, 2001) and so we will test it in this type of environment. 
Di Bella (2005) tested the stability of the money multiplier process in Rwanda, choosing the 
reserve to deposit ratio as a proxy and using as determinants both the interest rate and the ratio of 
time deposits to total deposits. We will use both variables and include the concentration ratio for 
the banking system, as will be explained in section 3. Other variables will reflect Angola’s 
macroeconomic challenges as will be clarified in section 4. 
We will use an ARDL approach to test our hypothesis, even though it is not usually used in money 
multiplier studies. We have chosen it because of the advantages it has delivered in monetary 
studies, specially about the demand for money, such as Bahmani-Oskooee (2007) and Budha 
(2012). This kind of analysis allows us to study both the long run relationship and the short-run 
adjustment to shocks as will be described in section 5. 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The money multiplier is integrated in a more general framework, starting from the equation of 
exchange 𝑀𝑉 = 𝑃𝑇, dating back to the Quantity Theory of Money (Hume, 1752), which states 
that a variation in the stock of money must have an impact in the level of prices in the long run 
(Keynes, 1923). Therefore, if a central bank wants to influence inflation it should control the 
money supply growth. However, even though acting as intermediaries, commercial banks create 
most of the money supply (Tobin, 1963), and it is only the monetary base, a central bank’s 
liability, that is directly controlled. The equation of exchange could be further expanded to 
𝑚𝐵𝑉 = 𝑃𝑌 (Beckworth, 2017), so that the base (B) times the money multiplier (m), reflects the 
medium of exchange (M) within the economy. 
In the widely used introductory monetary economics textbook Mishkin (2007) there is a general 
description of the money multiplier process. It rests on a disequilibrium process created by the 
central bank as the monopolist creator of reserve balances (monetary base). Whenever the central 




bank buys a commercial bank’s Treasury bill (or for that matter, any sort of purchase), it creates 
an equal amount of excessive reserves. Banks will try to avoid the low yield of a reserve asset, 
creating an additional bank loan (and corresponding deposit). As the deposit leaves the bank’ 
balance sheet, it increases the level of other banks excessive reserves (the value of the deposit 
times one minus the required coefficient ratio). By trying to avoid the “hot potato” of low yielding 
bank reserves and creating deposits in the process, banks unknowingly create a multiple 
expansion of monetary aggregates. 
Therefore, when in 2008, central banks reacted to the financial crisis by buying a large quantity 
of assets - and creating large amounts of bank reserves - some advocated that the increase in the 
monetary base would lead to further increases in lending which would in a multiplicative way 
produce large quantities of money, pushing up prices well above central banks targets. However, 
there was no such thing as a rise in inflation, because the multiplier decreased abruptly, as the 
denominator – monetary base – faced a higher percentage growth than any broad monetary 
aggregate.  
To understand what happened and how is the money multiplier still useful, one needs to be 
knowledgeable of the hierarchical structure of money (Bell, 2001; Mehrling 2012). In a 
hierarchical monetary structure, the institution that sits atop of the “monetary pyramid” is not 
constrained to expand its assets and liabilities, expanding its liabilities whenever it wants to buy 
an asset. In a regime of flexible exchange rates, the central bank sits in the top of the monetary 
pyramid and therefore can create monetary base without constraints, by expanding its balance 
sheet. 
A commercial bank also creates money (deposits) whenever it buys something (like the debt of 
an agent – bank lending) but as it will probably face adverse clearing, the availability of bank 
reserves may constrain the creation of bank credit and bank deposits. However, the level of bank 
reserves (component of the monetary base) can never be a constraint to multiple deposit creation 
within the banking system, if a flexible exchange rate central bank wishes so. 




Other constraints will exist, like the amount of bank capital sometimes with a binding legal ratio, 
the credit worthiness of its borrowers and the inherent competition among financial intermediaries 
(Tobin, 1963). But reserves should never be a constraint, because a central bank must stabilize 
the payment system and therefore must create reserves on demand to both allow banks to fulfil 
its reserve requirements, to settle payments and to allow deposit withdrawals by customers 
(Fullwiler, 2008). By removing the reserve constraint, the central bank can fix the interest rate 
exogenously (Moore, 1988). Otherwise, if it wishes to control the level of reserves, the interest 
rate will be set endogenously, which may create a lot of financial disturbances coming from the 
volatility in the market interest rates.  
Therefore most central banks nowadays, choose an interest rate target, the rate that better 
accomplishes its medium-term goals. In that sense, the money supply will become endogenous, 
and monetary base (through reserve requirements and/or currency) must follow along 
endogenously. When the central bank chooses to supply monetary base exogenously, it will not 
have a guaranteed multiplier effect. If the central bank is not paying interest on excessive reserves, 
an increase in reserves above the level desired by the system, will lead to a decrease in the 
interbank interest rate as banks lend extra reserves in the interbank market. The decrease in 
interest rates impacts all the interest rates within the economy and perhaps increase the amount 
of bank lending (generating more deposits). However, if the interest rate stops decreasing 
(because of the zero lower bound or interest on reserves) the increase of bank lending may stop, 
stopping the increase in the money supply and therefore decreasing the money multiplier as more 
reserves are injected.  
The existence of interest on reserves creates therefore a decoupling between reserve balances and 
interest rates (Keister, 2008) that necessarily breaks the money multiplier whenever the central 
bank wishes to expand its balance sheet, above the level of desired reserve balances. The 
decoupling principle illustrates that the level of bank reserves and interest rates become 
independent giving the central bank an extra tool to steer the economy.  




Therefore, the process of money creation by the banks will never be reserve constrained whenever 
the central bank is targeting interest rates in a flexible exchange regime. In this case, the stability 
of the money multiplier ratio is guaranteed by the action of the central bank and is more correct 
to view it as a money divisor (Lebourva, 1962). 
In a fixed exchange regime, where the central bank has to maintain an amount of international 
reserves to redeem its liabilities (monetary base) the central bank will be constrained by its amount 
of international reserves and the ratio that it fixes them to the monetary base, which may create a 
central bank multiplier (ratio between monetary base and international reserves) and afterwards a 
money multiplier (ratio between broad money and monetary base) by controlling the amount of 
bank reserves and required reserve ratio. 
In this sense, if the link is kept and Hume’s price specie flow mechanism (Hume, 1752) operates, 
money will be in a way endogenous but determined not by the commercial banks and borrowers 
but by the balance of payments position. However, the determinants of the multiplier, the currency 
and the reserve ratio, may lead to variations in the equilibrium money multiplier and therefore to 
the evolution of the money supply. The hypotheses of personal currency hoarding as bank’s 
reserve hoarding may lead to a decrease in the multiplier, but the stock of money will always be 
reserve constrained as there are two conversion rates to fulfil (the deposit-reserve parity and the 
reserve-foreign exchange reserve) to maintain both the stability of the banking system and the 
stability of the exchange rate. This mechanism could only work if the central bank fixed the supply 
of reserves. It has been shown that in a flexible exchange rate regime that will probably go against 
central banks goals. In a fixed exchange regime (specially in currency boards and dollarized 
regimes) the central bank should face the disciplinary force of the balance of payments and 
therefore it could act in a way that constrains the creation of deposits (by bank lending or other 
purchase by commercial banks), creating therefore the possibility of a money multiplier whenever 
the constraint is eased, by an increase in the supply of reserves or a decrease in the demand for it.  




However, if central banks don’t abide to a fixed ratio of international reserves to monetary base, 
there is an automatic sterilization process that will eliminate the process that a balance of 
payments imbalance may cause to money creation (Lavoie, 2001) and invalidating yet again the 
money multiplier model.  
In Selgin (1988), the money multiplier is analysed as a stabilizer of nominal income to shocks in 
inside money demand, in a free banking monetary regime with a fixed supply of monetary base 
and no reserve requirements. Therefore, with a fixed supply of monetary base, whenever people 
demand more money the free banking system would increase the money supply to accommodate 
it and therefore the increase in money demand (fall in money velocity) would lead to an increase 
in money supply (and in the money multiplier as monetary base is fixed) to maintain monetary 
stability. This happens as banks decrease their precautionary demand for reserves when depositors 
lower the turnover of their deposits (increase in inside money demand), expanding credit to 
creditworthy borrowers (increase in inside money supply). The author states that this would work 
in a free banking monetary system but the existence of monetary controls by a central bank 
disenables the system to achieve rapidly and efficiently monetary equilibrium.  
In the free banking example there is no central bank and therefore no reserve requirements and 
the monetary base is only variable by outside flows (balance of payments surplus). In our example 
(Angola), even though there is a central bank that fixes reserve requirements, they aren’t 
completely distortionary, as we can observe by the high levels of excessive reserves. However, 
reserves are required for both demand and time deposits with the same coefficient (17% by June 
2018). The monetary base is highly dependent on foreign exchange flows and therefore is quite 
susceptible to shocks, depending if the national currency is under or overvalued against the US 
dollar.   
In Selgin (1994) the author proves theoretically that the money multiplier (using the reserve to 
deposits ratio as a proxy) responds to money demand shocks to achieve nominal stability. 
However, he concedes that the long run equilibrium of the reserve ratio may be influenced by the 




degree of competition in the banking system, by the composition of the deposit aggregates and 
by the interest rate.  
As the deposit market share of a bank decreases, the probability that increasing loans lead to 
adverse clearing increases, as less costumers have their deposits in the expanding bank. Therefore, 
the demand for reserves by any individual bank should change inversely with its deposit market 
share. When a banking system becomes more competitive, there will occur an increase in reserve 
demand for larger banks that are losing market share combined with a decrease of demand by 
smaller banks that are gaining market share, which means the impact of bank concentration is 
ambiguous. The change in the degree of liabilities’ liquidity allows banks to better manage the 
maturity of their assets. Therefore, with an increase of the time deposits share of total deposits, 
banks would demand a lower level of reserves to face adverse clearing, easing their liquidity 
constraint to expand credit. The interest rate usually acts as an opportunity cost to have idle 
balances. 
The present study’s objective is to test the equilibrium reserve ratio (as a proxy of the multiplier) 
when a banking system faces shifts in its structure of competition, when the interest rate moves 
and when the liquidity of the deposit liabilities changes. Moreover, we will include some country 
specific variables to take into account the current challenges the Angolan economy faces. 
ANGOLA’S ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
The choice of Angola is based on three important factors: 
1. A fixed (or quasi-fixed) exchange rate in the period of analysis, which creates a systemic 
constraint for loan and deposit expansion; 
2. Regular oil revenues monetization, which leads to regular injections of monetary base; 
3. A developing interbank and secondary market for liquidity, which causes banks to have 
a high level of precautionary reserves. 




During the years analysed, the exchange rate regime has varied between a dirty peg with the US 
dollar until December 2017 and a crawling band against the Euro since 2018, thus anchoring the 
Kwanza and therefore creating a constraint to excessive monetary expansions. 
That constraint is easier or tighter depending on balance of payments flows. The foreign exchange 
inflows affect the monetary base because oil companies sell US dollars to the Banco Nacional de 
Angola to buy goods and services in national currency and the Government uses its US dollar oil 
revenues to spend in national currency (by monetizing it via central bank).  
Those injections of reserve balances in the banking system are not perfectly sterilized by the 
central bank, causing regular big shifts in the monetary base and therefore in the money multiplier 
(because M2 is affected in a smaller proportion), even though in November 2017, the Central 
Bank has adopted the monetary base as its operational variable. Despite that volatility of reserve 
balances, the stability of the overnight interbank interest rate combined with the high levels of 
excessive reserves presupposes banks have a high level of demand for reserves (Figure 3 - 
Appendix). That high demand must be caused by the poorly developed market for funding 
liquidity and secondary market for financial assets, that causes a necessity for a high level of 
precautionary reserves to face adverse clearings.  
During the period of analysis, the banking system has witnessed the entry of numerous foreign 
banks as the opening of several branches of new national banks. Even though it is still highly 
concentrated among its top five banks, it has been observed a decrease in market concentration, 
which theoretically could lead to a higher demand for precautionary reserves by the entering 
smaller banks and therefore to a minor adjustment of the banking system to monetary base shocks. 
However, the increase in competition has led to further financial developments in the interbank 
and secondary markets.  
Starting in 2014, with the reduction of international oil prices, Angola faced a severe crisis with 
shortages of foreign exchange inflows penalizing the imports of goods and services. Banco 
Nacional de Angola, Angola’s central bank, restricted the foreign exchange market to specified 




sectors, to protect the deteriorating level of international reserves, which led to an increasing 
black-market spread. As the central bank controlled the foreign exchange auctions, banks started 
to hoard more reserves because of the implied uncertainty of foreign exchange auctions calendar 
and amounts sold.  
At the same time, with the deteriorating economic conditions, the ratio of nonperforming loans 
started to increase, which created another dent on banks’ willingness to expand loans to businesses 
and entrepreneurs.   
In the next section we will describe the variables that we will use and the methodology chosen to 
conduct the study. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data for the monetary aggregates, deposits, loans, reserves, interest rates, exchange rates are 
all retrieved from Banco Nacional de Angola’s monetary accounts and other statistical bulletins, 
from 2012 until June 2018. All the variables selected were chosen in the national currency (AOA 
– Angolan Kwanza) not being considered foreign currency deposits and loans. The money 
multiplier is derived by the ratio of the broad money supply with the broad monetary base. The 
broad monetary base includes notes and coins in circulation, bank reserves (both free and 
required) and central bank short-term absorption instruments. The broad money supply includes 
notes and coins, demand deposits and time deposits. The ratio of reserves to deposits includes all 
the reserves (including absorption instruments) divided by the total amount of deposits. The 
foreign exchange rate spread is the spread between the black-market rate and the official central 
bank foreign exchange rate.  Finally, the degree of bank competition is calculated using the 
Herfindahl index, representing the deposits’ market share of banks in Angola’s banking system. 
The model chosen to test the hypothesises of long run determinants for the reserve ratio and 
money multiplier is the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. This model includes 
lags of both the dependent and independent variables as regressors, which allows to test for 




cointegrating vectors among them (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). The advantage of this approach 
comparing to others is that it allows for different orders of integration among the chosen 
variables.  
The cointegration relationship between the dependent variable and the regressors is estimated 
and the long-run parameter estimates are derived. Finally, we test for cointegration by 
deriving the conditional error correction in the cointegration bounds test of Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith (2001). This standard F-test or Wald-test is robust to whether variables of interest are 
I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. The long-run relationship that we are investigating is the 
following one: 
(1) (𝑟𝑡/𝑡𝑑𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽3(𝑑𝑑𝑡/𝑡𝑑𝑡) + 𝛽4𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑡  + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝑟𝑡 is bank reserves, 𝑡𝑑𝑡is total deposits, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 is the concentration index, 𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡 is the 
interbank interest rate, 𝑑𝑑𝑡 is demand deposits, 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 is the foreign exchange spread and 𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑡 
is the non-performing loans ratio. To give robustness to our investigation, we will test also the 
same model but with the money multiplier as the dependent variable (𝑚𝑚𝑡). 
The error correction model representation of the ARDL allows to estimate the speed of 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. The coefficient of the error correction term (ECT), 
which represents the residual of the long-term equation, gives us the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium in every period. If the model is correctly specified, we expect this coefficient (𝜆0) 
to be negative and highly significant. We also included as control variables, 𝑑𝑒𝑝_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑 as the 
difference between bank deposits and bank credits; and 𝑟𝑟_𝑏𝑟, as the ratio between 
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To evaluate the performance of the model we provided tests for serial correlation, 
normality and heteroscedasticity in the residuals from our estimated equations. The 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ residual tests have also been applied to test model instability. 
These tests are based in the cumulative sum of recursive residuals and squared residuals 
(Brown, Durbin and Evans, 1975). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The first step of our study is to check whether variables are stationary (in levels or first 
differences) before using them in the regressions. The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and 
Philips-Perron (PP) tests are used to determine the order of integration I(d) or the number of 
unit roots (if any) contained in each series of the variables.  Both unit root tests state the 
presence of a unit root under the null hypothesis. Table 1 shows the results found for 
regressions with a constant term and with both a constant and a trend when testing for the 
presence of a unit root. 
The unit root tests that include a constant and trend in test regression (Table 1) leads us to 
reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root for log(HHI) and money multiplier, at 
99% and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  Both ADF and PP test statistics fail to reject 
the null of a unit root in each of the other variables at conventional test sizes. The ADF tests 










Table 1– ADF and PP unit root tests 
 




 Constant Constant and trend 
Test for unit root in levels (H0: Series has a unit root) 
𝑟_𝑑 -1.839 -2.503  -1.606 -2.300 
𝑚𝑚 -1.491 -3.257*  -1.037 -3.257* 
log(HHI) -1.446 -4.455***    -0.976 -4.273*** 
luibor -0.186 -2.345  -0.334 -1.978 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 -1.214 -0.980  -1.366 -1.465 
𝑛𝑝𝑙 -1.013 -2.703  -0.969 -2.701 
𝑑𝑑_𝑡𝑑 -2.513 -2.611  -2.229 -2.397 
𝑟𝑟_𝑏𝑟 -2.264 -2.528  -2.365 -2.732 
𝑑𝑒𝑝_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑 -0.795 -1.185  -0.846 -1.491 
      
Test for unit root in first differences (H0: Series has two unit roots) 
𝑟_𝑑 -9.110*** -9.085***  -9.745*** -10.113*** 
𝑚𝑚 -8.140*** -8.096***  -10.584*** -10.469*** 
log(HHI) -14.871*** -14.768***  -16.248*** -16.129*** 
luibor -6.915*** -6.943***  -6.840*** -6.821*** 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 -11.988*** -11.980***  -11.754*** -11.755*** 
𝑛𝑝𝑙 -8.931*** -8.872***  -8.930*** -8.896*** 
𝑑𝑑_𝑡𝑑 -11.007*** -9.706***  -11.792*** -12.948*** 
𝑟𝑟_𝑏𝑟 -7.507*** -7.457***  -7.562*** -7.488*** 
𝑑𝑒𝑝_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑 -8.088*** -8.045***  -8.140*** -8.098*** 
Notes: ***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.   
 
The existence of the long-run relationship between the reserve ratio and the explanatory 
variables has been tested using the F-bounds cointegration test of Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(2001). Table 2 reports results for PSS cointegration test, showing signs of a cointegration 
relation at the confidence level of 1% level.  
 
Table 2– F-statistic for cointegration relationships 
 
Notes: If p-value<0.1 of F-statistics, reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the confidence level of 1% level. 
  
Model (dep. variable) F-statistics 
Critical value bounds of the F-statistic  
95% 99%  
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)  
𝑟_𝑑 8.065 3.12 4.25 3.93 5.23  
𝑚𝑚 5.998 3.12 4.25 3.93 5.23  




The long run coefficients are displayed in Table 3. If we consider that the money multiplier has a 
theoretical negative relationship with the reserve ratio, we should expect opposite signs for the 
coefficients presented, as observed.  
 
Table 3– Long-run ARDL estimation and cointegration testing (Unrestricted constant and 
trend) 
 
Notes: The Akaike Info Criterion is used to select the lag length for the ARDL model. LM test is the Lagrange Multiplier 
test of residual serial correlation; Normality test is based on skewness and kurtosis; Ramsey Reset test is the Ramsey 
test for omitted variables/functional form and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey heteroskedasticity test. If the F-statistic of 
the PSS cointegration test is above the upper critical value, one rejects the null hypothesis of no linear relationship (or 
cointegration). 
 
From Table 3 we conclude that all the independent variables are statistically significant, except  
𝑑𝑑_𝑡𝑑. The degree of competition in the banking system tends to decrease the money multiplier 
as banks increase their reserve ratio.  An increase in 1% in HHI (which implies higher 
concentration) decreases the reserve ratio by 0,98 p.p. and increases the multiplier by 0.05, as a 
less competitive banking system has lower demand for precautionary reserves to avoid adverse 
clearing. This shows that an increase in reserve demand by larger banks that lose market share is 
superior the decrease in reserve demand of smaller banks that gain market share. An increase in 
the non-performing loan ratio has a positive impact in the ratio by reducing banks’ willingness to 
lend, decreasing the money multiplier. The interbank rate has a positive impact on the reserve 
ratio (and negative on the multiplier) as it was expected because of the implied cost on interbank 
markets of a shortage of reserves when facing adverse clearing, when this cost increases banks 
 Dependent variable 
 𝑟_𝑑  𝑚𝑚  
 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  
log(HHI) -98.674 0.000  5.165 0.000  
𝑛𝑝𝑙 0.756 0.000  -0.050 0.002  
luibor 0.547 0.000  -0.025 0.034  
𝑑𝑑_𝑡𝑑 -0.131 0.623  -0.001 0.948  
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.032 0.018  -0.002 0.028  
       
Diagnostic test Test statistic p-value  Test statistic p-value  
Serial correlation test (4) 0.846 0.503  1.589 0.192  
Ramsey Reset test (2) 1.070 0.351  0.550 0.580  
Normality test 1.614 0.446  0.768 0.681  
Heteroskedasticity test  1.001 0.478  1.425 0.157  




will be more cautious to invest those same reserves. The foreign exchange spread also has an 
expected positive sign by increasing banks demand for reserves to face unexpected foreign 
exchange auctions by the central bank. Finally, the percentage of demand deposits to total deposits 
has an opposite sign to what would be expected. Nevertheless, it is not statistically significant, 
probably because of the reserve requirement regulation, as already explained. We will further 
explore this issue in the policy recommendation section.  
To specify the short-term equation, two other exogenous variables were included. The difference 
between total bank deposits and total bank lending and the ratio of the required reserves to total 
reserves. The difference between deposits and credits was included as a control variable in order 
to only be considered short-term adjustments in the reserve ratio and/or money multiplier that 
keeps the difference between deposits and credits constant, to avoid central bank intervention to 
stabilize the multiplier and only considering adjustments in the multiplier/reserve ratio that reflect 
the disequilibrium process that occurs when the banking system expands by creating deposits. 
The ratio of reserves was included in the short-term relationship to consider only the amount of 
reserves that are not legally required and that therefore provide the liquidity to generate the 
disequilibrium money creation process.  
The coefficient of the error correction term for both models is negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that the cointegration relations as the models itself are correctly specified. 
The value of the error correction term for the reserve ratio (63%) implies relatively faster 
adjustment to shocks in the short run comparing to the money multiplier (56%). Nevertheless, in 
both cases more than half of the convergence is achieved in one period (month).  
The diagnostic tests applied to the model show no evidence of serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. The RESET test implies a correctly specified ARDL model and the Jarque-
Bera normality test indicates that the residuals are normally distributed for both models. 




In the final stage, the stability of the long-run coefficients is examined by using the CUSUM and 
CUSUM squares tests. The graphical presentation of these tests is presented in the figures below. 
Both the reserve ratio and the money multiplier are within the 5% bound in the CUSUM test for 
stability, however the money multiplier shows inferior performance in the CUSUMSQ test, which 
implies a better fit for the long run relationship of reserve ratio. 





Figure 1– CUSUM and CUSUMSQ residual tests for r_d model 





Our study suggests that even though Angola’s financial system is currently under development, 
up to a point that the money multiplier process may lose significance, the still underdeveloped 
interbank money market causes frictions that may cause the multiplier disequilibrium. 
Therefore, and after observing that the liquidity of banks’ deposit base is not statistically 
significant in determining the long-run reserve deposit ratio, the central bank must take steps to 
differentiate the required reserve ratio between time and demand deposits, with the purpose of 
enhancing banks incentive to deepen the financial instruments provided to their clients. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to see if the interbank interest rate volatility will increase, 
adding complexity to the central bank’ task of managing liquidity, as the interbank market keeps 
on developing. When those features of the interbank market develop it is advisable for the central 
bank to set a narrow corridor system to enhance its ability to target interest rates. At that stage of 
monetary control, the reserve to deposit ratio may gain relevance to monetary policy, as the central 
bank supplies the amount of reserves demanded for the normal interbank market settlement 
process. When that occurs the money multiplier process loses relevance, leading to its stability 













The money multiplier model has led recently to a great amount of interest in its impact in the 
conduction of monetary policy. After various studies questioning the money multiplier process in 
a flexible exchange rate regime where the central bank sets interest rates, our study purpose was 
to search for some applicability of the concept in a country with a fixed exchange regime and a 
poorly developed financial system.  
Following Selgin’s (1994) determinants for banks’ reserve ratio, we tested the long run 
relationship between this ratio and the interbank interest rate, the liquidity of banks’ deposits and 
the level of concentration of the banking system, considering recent distresses of the Angolan 
economy such as the black market spread and the non-performing loans ratio. However, the 
degree of liquidity of banks’ liabilities isn’t one of the main determinants of the reserve ratio and 
therefore of the money multiplier. This conclusion of our study opens the possibility for the Banco 
Nacional de Angola to differentiate their reserve requirements to allow banks, in their profit 
optimizing operations, to further develop Angola’s financial system. 
Therefore, our empirical analysis and results create a novel way to look to the multiplier process, 
first developed by Philips (1921), which may be applied in several other countries with similar 
economic environment, where liquidity mismatches may generate a monetary multiplier 
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Table 4– Data definition 
Variable Description Unit 
r_d Ratio between total reserves and total deposits in national currency % 
mm Ratio between M2 (money supply) and broad monetary base in national currency units 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration of bank deposits units 
npl Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans % 
luibor Luanda Interbank Offered Rate (interbank interest rate) % 
dd_td Ratio between demand deposits and total deposits % 
spread Spread between black market and official exchange rate % 
dep_cred Difference between total deposits and total credits in banking system millions AOA 




Table 5– Descriptive statistics 
 r_d mm HHI npl luibor dd_td spread dep_cred rr_br 
 Mean  30.66586  2.587198  1243.167  13.09116  10.94815  60.72241  66.78700  1070120.  59.91725 
 Median  28.25193  2.664429  1227.500  12.07000  6.395000  61.44873  41.85698  1298715.  54.99525 
 Maximum  52.77369  3.464886  1515.000  32.70000  23.67000  67.88374  234.5677  1998729.  89.99868 
 Minimum  20.84970  1.632563  1057.000  2.500000  2.940000  49.89093  4.259190  30516.00  38.39371 
 Std. Dev.  7.716190  0.462434  146.0162  8.259717  6.841488  4.042849  66.25124  667185.3  13.90870 
 Skewness  1.037760 -0.339622  0.287488  0.967043  0.630720 -0.544288  0.811743 -0.113884  0.475300 
 Kurtosis  3.132036  2.060429  1.538198  2.847288  1.921651  2.865135  2.479498  1.372665  1.955439 
          
 Jarque-Bera  14.05696  4.368543  8.019251  12.23303  8.950717  3.910350  9.446554  8.775321  6.482927 
 Probability  0.000886  0.112560  0.018140  0.002206  0.011386  0.141540  0.008886  0.012430  0.039107 
          




















































𝑟_𝑑  𝑚𝑚 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
∆log (HHI)t -0.300 0.02    
∆log (HHI)t−1 0.229 0.01    
∆log (HHI)t−2 0.129 0.05    
∆nplt 0.174 0.07  1.399 0.084 
∆nplt−1 -0.278 0.01  1.116 0.161 
∆nplt−2 -0.291 0.01  1.979 0.011 
∆nplt−3 -0.291 0.01  -3.958 0.000 
∆dd_dtt 0.518 0.00  -2.981 0.001 
∆dd_dtt−1 0.513 0.00  -1.183 0.158 
∆dd_dtt−2 0.276 0.03  1.399 0.084 
∆spreadt 0.009 0.43  -0.028 0.719 
∆spreadt−1 -0.026 0.02  0.187 0.023 
𝑑𝑒𝑝_𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑t -3.36E-08 0.00  0.1E-06 0.046 
𝑟𝑟_𝑏𝑟t 0.039 0.04  -0.228 0.090 
𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 -0.634 0.00  -0.557 0.00 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡  4.855 0.00  -19.80 0.000 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  -0.006 0.00  0.036 0.000 
      
𝑅2  0.618  0.548 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
2  0.510  0.450 
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